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Youth justice pathways to change: Drivers, challenges and 
opportunities 
 
How and why does youth justice change? What is the nature of this change – constructive, 
regressive, real, rhetorical? Furthermore, what is the focus of this change – systemic, 
structural, political, philosophical, practical? This paper examines the pathways by which 
change is affected in youth justice, the mechanisms and processes operating along these 
pathways and the central challenges to understanding and implementing real change. We 
begin with the premise that change has been a constant in United Kingdom (UK) youth 
justice since the earliest differentiated responses to children who offend (see Case 2018), yet 
the extent and nature of this change has been complex, contingent and contested; oscillating 
between the aspirational, rhetorical and actual. Moreover, the pathways through which 
change has been achieved in the youth justice field have been opaque and beset by conflict 
and ambivalence regarding how to understand and treat children who offend. Throughout its 
trajectories of change, youth justice has, paradoxically, retained and supported a considerable 
stability in its organisation and approach and in terms of the outcomes experienced by 
children0F1. Stability has been the product of political, economic and academic investment in 
particular understandings of and responses to offending by children, which have been by-
products and causes of entrenchment and resistance to change on the part of key stakeholders. 
The resulting inertia, protectionism and revolution (i.e. repeating and relying on past 
constructions of youth justice) has exacerbated conflict and ambivalence in the youth justice 
arena, whilst ‘change’ has tended towards the rhetorical and stochastic in nature - more 
apparent than real (McAra 2017). Furthermore, the assumptions of linearity that are redolent 
in historical narratives of change serve to over-simplify and even invalidate understandings of 
pathways. Where real change can be discerned, the pathways towards it are rarely linear and 
predictable and the influences on change are rarely simplistic or directly causal. Pathways are 
often catalysed by political responses to public debates, rather than effective youth justice 
practice, and thus characterised by zig-zagging policy changes. This has resulted in pathways 
which are at times chaotic, unpredictable, complex and multi-faceted in nature, with a 
progressively unfocused and confused model-base, as will become evident.  
                                                          
1 Following the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child definition of a ‘child’ as anyone aged up 
to 18-years-old (UNCRC 1989; see also Haines and Case 2015). 
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This paper examines pathways to change in youth justice - a broad arena populated by the 
systems, structures, policies, strategies, philosophies and practices that address offending by 
children (see Case 2018). Our primary focus will be the raft of sweeping changes experienced 
in the contemporary context of youth justice post-Crime and Disorder Act 1998 in England 
and Wales, with preceding changes explored selectively and where appropriate. Pursuing a 
comprehensive, definitive and internationally-informed history of change in youth justice is 
beyond the scope and focus of a stand-alone journal paper. The sheer breadth, complexity and 
longevity of youth justice preclude this. Whilst this enforced restriction leaves our arguments 
open to criticism, this paper is intended to test a number of assumptions and to open up an 
evolving debate regarding the nature of change in youth justice (including the implications 
for international jurisdictions) and how it can be constructed, understood and influenced. 
Accordingly, we explore the mechanisms, processes and key stakeholders driving and 
shaping change in contemporary youth justice, the challenges experienced along trajectories 
of change and the opportunities for enhancing youth justice presented by developing a better 
understanding of how change occurs. We apply an eco-systemic, critical analytical 
framework to identify and explore a series of macro-level (e.g. structural, philosophical, 
political), meso-level (e.g. organisational cultures and inter-relationships) and micro-level 
(e.g. practitioner-child relationships, practitioner discretion) influences upon policy change in 
contemporary youth justice in England and Wales. By analysing youth justice change as 
situated within processes that occur along complex and multi-faceted pathways, rather than 
as necessarily triggered by measurable causes acting in linear ways, we can develop ‘a firm 
understanding of where we are, how we got there and where we want to go next’ (Brett 2018: 
36). This will enable an exploration of how contemporary youth justice might navigate its 
uncertain, unpredictable journey from this point forward, should we choose to learn the 
lessons of the past. Our analytical framework is constituted by a series of identified potential 
pathways to change that are distinct, yet mutually-reciprocal: political, paradigmatic, 
research-led and cognisant. 
 
The nature of youth justice can be understood as shaped by dominant paradigms or models at 
any given point in time (see Case 2018). A ‘model’ of youth justice is a framework for u 
rationalising responses to it through guiding theories, principles and strategies that are 
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operationalised and implemented through formal structures, processes and practices. No 
paradigm or model for understanding and responding to offending by children has yet been 
fully articulated by youth justice structures, strategies and processes. Instead, the nature of 
youth justice and its animation within bespoke ‘systems’ has been marked by conflict and 
ambivalence (Shore 2011) – thorough-going confusion, complexity and ultimately hybridity 
in preferred rationale, organisation and approach. The extent and nature of youth justice 
change, compared to its stability across historical periods, therefore, is both moot and 
ambiguous. One constant, however, has been a significant role of possibly the central driver 
of change in youth justice - the political sphere.  
 
1. Political pathways 
Youth justice has been a political points winner since the earliest differentiation of children 
from adults when they offend. Since the mid-19th century, arguably from the late 18th century 
(see Shore 2011), successive UK governments have pursued reforms, often sweeping in 
nature, of youth justice structures, strategies, paradigms and practices. Related change has 
been pursued through political rhetoric, legislation and processes of monitoring/control 
balanced uneasily with support/guidance. The overarching aim of these reform/change 
activities has been variously economic, socio-cultural, principled, research-informed and 
pragmatic - but always political. Incumbent UK governments have exploited youth justice to 
cement their identity as proactive change-makers, implicitly and explicitly accusing 
predecessors (even from their own political party) of inertia and/or failure to enact change. 
The relentless push for change has even disregarded legacies of measurable ‘success’ in the 
Youth Justice System (YJS), such as the dramatic falls in first-time entrants in the 1980s and 
2007-16 decades, both of which were strongly associated with increased diversion practice 
and precipitated unconstructive, counterintuitive responses – punitive criminalisation (1990s) 
and an urgent review of the YJS (Taylor 2016) by the new Conservative Government.  
 
New governments commonly seek change in youth justice through ‘stochastic features of 
statecraft’ (McAra 2017) - differentiation from the past, re/constructing the youth justice 
architecture (e.g. structures), nurturing new audiences and introducing greater complexity 
into policy discourse. The pathways to this change are often  ‘stochastic’ (often more 
rhetorical and apparent than real), typically pursued (at least in part) to fulfil political 
agendas, rather than implemented for tangible, beneficial, evidence-based or otherwise 
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defensible reasons (Bateman 2017), thereby becoming obstacles to real change. A cogent 
example of political influence through ‘statecraft’ was the 1990’s punitive turn by the 
Conservative Government - a turn away from diversion and minimum necessary intervention 
approaches (which proved practically and financially effective during the 1980s) and towards 
expensive and ineffective custody and formal intervention to appear tough on crime to the 
voting public (Muncie 2014). This represented a regressive step back to harmful and 
ineffective punitive youth justice paradigms of the past; a retrenchment from the progressive 
practices of the 1980s. The punitive turn, therefore, embodied stability (not change) in youth 
justice through stasis (not dynamism) and regression (not progression). 
 
 
Political influence in focus: The ‘dynamic’ minimum age of criminal responsibility  
 
A powerful historical illustration of stochastic ‘change’ (not to mention stalling and general 
inertia) in youth justice is provided by variations to the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility (MACR) in England and Wales. The 1933 Children and Young Persons Act 
raised the MACR from 7 to 8 years of age, and the 1963 Act then raised it again to 10. The 
1969 Act made provision for the MACR to be increased to 14, but since its enactment 
coincided with a change of government, this was never actually realised. Furthermore, the 
provision of the presumption of doli incapax for children under 14 (meaning that the 
prosecution had to prove children’s understanding of the criminality of their behaviour, rather 
than mere naughtiness) was swept away in the 1990s’ ‘punitive turn’ and formally abolished 
by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which meant an effective lowering of the MACR.  
 
There have been various calls for the MACR to be increased over the years, with the latest 
Private Members Bill coming from Lord Dholakia – his third attempt at raising it to 12-years-
old. England and Wales have remained stagnant with a MACR of 10-years-old for well over 
50 years, against intense United Nations criticism of any sub-12-year old MACR, citing the 
Beijing Rules (minimum standards on youth justice), asserting that children under 12 lack the 
emotional, mental and intellectual maturity to be truly responsible for offending (McGuinness 
2016). Notwithstanding this, currently the Government’s position (similar to preceding 
governments of all colours) is that they have no plans to revise the MACR. 
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If political ‘changes’ prior to the Crime and Disorder Act 19981F2 steadily built towards the 
construction of a differential youth justice sector, albeit prevaricating between welfare-justice 
and all constructions of youth justice in between, developments since have done little more 
than tweak what is already in place and to encompass changing policies, government targets, 
and developing research understanding (not much of which has been complementary). These 
processes fit along a pathway to change characterised by superficiality (e.g. lazy assumptions 
of linearity), lack of criticality and over-riding pragmatism and politicisation – all obstacles to 
genuine progress. Subsequent changes to youth justice architecture have been more akin to a 
stochastic rearranging of the furniture (McAra 2017) through unreflective tinkering and 
bolting on. There has been a somewhat dogged adherence to the Risk Factor Prevention 
Paradigm (RFPP – see paradigmatic pathways section) as the main underlying model-base for 
the YJS, with any changes needing to fit within it to some degree – amounting to minor 
changes along a largely-stable policy trajectory. Such policy and practice commitment, 
particularly in the face of an incrementally critical evidence-base, suggests a degree of 
entrenchment; political, financial, practical and emotional investment in a pragmatic 
paradigm fitting a political agenda for managerialism, responsibilisation and neo-
correctionalism (Case and Haines 2015).  
 
Substantial change was discernible, however, through the Legal Aid, Sentencing and 
Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012. The LASPO Act reversed the tariff-based 
sentencing escalator of the Crime and Disorder Act, allowing once again for the cautioning of 
children, without ever-increasing levels of disposal (for example, a child who had previously 
served a prison sentence could be cautioned for a further, less serious, offence). After a 
decade of increasing system-activity towards children who offend, at last (and in response to 
research highlighting the damage of system-contact for children), it was acknowledged that 
more was not necessarily better. This led to reduced funding for the youth justice sector, 
justified by the falling numbers, and the notion that since the work of statutory, multi-agency 
Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) work was declining, the whole system could contract. The 
                                                          
2 Following the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a formal' Youth Justice System' (YJS) was created for England 
and Wales, rather than for the whole of the UK - as youth justice legislative and policy responsibilities had been 
devolved to the new governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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pathway to change here, occurring at a time of austerity could (as in the 1980s) be being 
driven purely by economics, albeit dressed up as addressing research concerns. However, 
whether incidental or deliberate, this sector reduction allowed children to escape the 
damaging clutches of the YJS thereby becoming an opportunity for beneficial change. 
 
As identified, a recurrent theme in trajectory of youth justice is that successive governments 
cannot leave it alone. Accordingly, the new Conservative Government (2015) commissioned 
a review (likely austerity-driven) of an ostensibly successful system. This could potentially 
have revolutionised the whole sector, allowing for a (near) complete re-assessment, rather 
than tinkering at the edges of the existent system. While Charlie Taylor’s (2016) resultant 
report offered interesting recommendations for change (e.g. paradigmatic shift to children 
first and education-focused responses, changing custody provision into smaller ‘secure 
schools’, abolishing the Youth Justice Board (YJB)), it stopped short of being particularly 
progressive (in, for example, specifically excluding a review of the MACR). However, by the 
time the report was published, Government personnel and priorities had changed, motivating 
a piecemeal acceptance of some recommendations, and complete rejection of others, notably 
the proposed abolition of the YJB (MoJ 2016). Still the basic structures of the YJS remained. 
 
The drivers of change in youth justice have been largely political, due to the tendency for 
youth crime as a social issue/problem to be a vote-winner (or loser). However, this has often 
resulted in stochastic changes that never really challenge underlying model bases or offer real 
change. This politically-driven policy change has been compounded by a YJB with an 
uncertain path or future. The opportunities here have begun, however, with the LASPO Act 
making changes radical enough to significantly impact numbers of children drawn into, and 
remaining within, the YJS, whilst also increasing the prominence of diversionary 
programmes to maintain this beneficial decrease through the reintroduction of cautions for 
children. While this could be a numbers game with youth justice figures, it also provides real 
opportunities to ensure that children are shielded from damaging contact with a damaging 
system (see McAra and McVie 2007).  
 
2. Paradigmatic pathways 
The current youth justice ‘system’ has been in place in some form for the entirety of the 21st 
century, but various governments have attempted to tweak it to fit either their different 
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agendas or newer thinking, without really questioning or necessarily understanding the very 
underpinning paradigm or conceptual ‘model’ upon which it has been built. This conceptual 
framework at different points in history, has exerted significant influence upon how the YJS 
has developed since its progressive inception. The treatment of children who offend has 
undergone many metamorphoses through the centuries. Socio-historical constructions of 
youth justice have oscillated between strategies such as punitiveness (e.g. custody), reform, 
justice (e.g. just deserts, proportionality), welfare, education, restoration, minimum-
intervention/diversion and risk prevention to varying degrees at different points in time - 
often within complex and hybrid ‘mixed economy’ models (paradigms) that have been given 
expression by bespoke structures and processes (cf. Case 2018). As such, the evolution of 
youth justice is characterised as beset by recurring tensions, often embodying the conflict and 
ambivalence that still feature in 21st century youth justice debates. Successive government 
legislation has created a patchwork quilt system, with no discernible, coherent paradigm, 
philosophy or set of consolidating principles (see Muncie 2008), despite broad-brush 
caricatures framing historical youth justice developments within the perennial ‘welfare versus 
justice debate’ (Smith 2005). Indeed, by the 1990s, the welfare and justice elements of youth 
justice that had allegedly shaped its historical paradigmatic trajectory were being heavily 
criticised, with welfarism caricatured as laissez-fairer, justice as ineffectual (Smith 2005). 
The YJS was lambasted as ineffective and inefficient in the Audit Commission’s (1996) 
report ‘Misspent Youth’, which privileged contemporary risk-based models of assessment 
and addressment, most notably the RFPP (RFPP; Hawkins and Catalano 1992).  
 
The RFPP embodied a paradigm shift for youth justice – no longer privileging welfare or 
justice, but rather a risk-led, neo-liberal neo-correctionalism (Hazel 2008). This was 
embraced by the ‘New Labour’ Government of 1997, which legislated the espoused 
‘evidence-based’ risk approach into systems of assessment and (early) intervention through 
the Crime and Disorder Act  1998, thus animating their punitive, interventionist and vote-
winning mantra ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’. The fit between paradigm 
and political agenda is palpable here. The RFPP was an ideal vehicle through which to pursue 
a ‘new youth justice’ (Goldson 2000) of neo-liberal responsibilisation, interventionism and 
managerialism, all couched in the language of ‘evidence-based’ policy. However, here the 
paradigmatic constructive influence constituted more of a post-hoc justification of pre-formed 
policy direction - more policy-based evidence than evidence-based policy. The RFPP was an 
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idea whose time had come (Case and Haines 2009), providing as it did a reliable (consistent) 
evidence-base to rationalise policy change. The government’s lack of criticality and 
awareness regarding the robustness, completeness and appropriateness of applying this 
evidence-base since 1998 has been a constant bone of contention (cf. Goldson and Hughes 
2010). Indeed, the RFPP has been subject to widespread evidential, methodological and 
ethical critique for two decades now due to its partiality (bias and incompleteness), self-
replicating/fulfilling evidence-base, invalid, presumptive and overstated conclusions and its 
negative impact on understandings of children when they offend (Case and Haines 2015, 
2009).  
 
Thereafter, this ‘new youth justice’ system in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which 
carried with it unchallenged the ghosts of previous debates and controversies, became its own 
huge centralised, managerial universe – with managerialism functioning as the strategic 
vehicle through which to mobilise the RFPP and its associated agenda of responsibilisation. 
Multi-agency YOTs were created to deliver court-ordered face-to-face work to children, after 
assessment of their ‘criminogenic needs’ (risk factors framed as the ‘causes’ of crime), which 
were overseen by the centralised YJB. Discretion for responses to ‘youth offending' was 
discarded in favour of an interventionist, criminalising tariff/escalator, bringing children far 
more inevitably to court, with severely limited pre-court options. The result was an explosion 
of numbers at all stages of the process, from first-time-entrants to those being given custody. 
Interventions were seen as essential to help children address the reasons for their offending, 
conceptualised as largely within the individual or their immediate context (ultra-positivism). 
External issues increasing the ‘risk’ of offending (like poverty) were acknowledged, but 
unchallenged by the response, despite multi-agency teams capable of addressing wider more 
structural elements of risk, including health, education, and family- based issues. The 
potential for addressing these was largely missed by the individual focus of risk-led YOT 
practice, but potentially points the way for a more constructive development. 
 
The paradigmatic drivers of youth justice policy development can be seen as largely political 
in nature, reacting to public concerns, and contributing to the punitive turn of the 1990s, 
justified through reference to outdated and questionable literature. The culmination for 
contemporary youth justice – a paradigm shift towards risk as dominant – saw a move away 
from the welfare-justice debate, creating a system which is neither protective nor just for the 
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children it subsumes. The challenge from this is how the YJS can move into the new world of 
the twenty-first century, with its changing perceptions of ‘youth’ and attempts both to 
reframe the hegemonic risk-led evidence-base and to foster new research frontiers to develop 
different evidence with which to inform policy and practice. 
 
3. Research-led pathways  
The influence of empirical research and academic scholarship on the nature of youth justice, 
often through interactions with political and paradigmatic pathways, has waxed and waned 
historically. Academia has played a role in shaping political definitions (constructions) and 
explanations (theories) of offending by children, including contributing empirical and 
scholarly evidence to the pivotal constructions of ‘child’, ‘youth’ and ‘offending’ (Case 
2018). Academics and researchers have also contributed to debates around appropriate and 
effective responses to offending behaviour (i.e. ‘youth justice’). However, reflective of 
academia itself, a large degree of subjectivity and partiality has guided government and its 
agents (e.g. YJB) in their prioritisation of particular definitions, explanations and responses 
over alternatives. Political acceptance of, and resistance to, the academy has fluctuated 
widely, often dependent upon political expediency. Examples of governmental conflict and 
ambivalence regarding academia are abundant. They include the early 20th century political 
embracing of Hall’s (1904) construction of ‘adolescence’ that reconciled the innocent child-
dangerous offender paradox (Case 2018), the 1980s ‘successful revolution’ towards 
diversionary practice (Allen 1991), the 1990s punitive turn that contradicted the existing 
(academic and empirical) effective practice evidence-base (Bateman 2017) and the ‘new 
youth justice’ reconstruction of the entire YJS around the empirically-hegemonic RFPP 
(Hampson 2018). The overriding implication is that research-led (academic, scholarly) 
influence populates pathways to change in youth justice largely when it suits political agenda 
in response to specific socio-political/cultural/economic contexts and changes - the selective 
integration of political expedience with research evidence (Smith 2014). This again implies a 
political driver, rather than research evidence - leading to policy-based evidence over 
evidence-based policy. The development of the YJS as underpinned by the RFPP is a good 
example, as the model-base itself has become an obstacle to progress towards practice likely 
to reduce children’s offending.  
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The RFPP as an obstacle to policy and practice change 
 
The RFPP rose to prominence as a significant influence on youth justice in England and 
Wales on the back of a burgeoning emphasis on cogent evidence-base, most notably, 
evidence from the longitudinal, multi-method Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development 
(the ‘Cambridge Study’ - West and Farrington 1973; Farrington 2007). Over nearly 60 years, 
the researchers repeatedly identified psychosocial risk factors in childhood and adolescence 
(in family, school, neighbourhood, peer and individual domains of life) that statistically 
predict later offending and associated aspects of a ‘criminal career’ (e.g. onset, persistence, 
escalation). These risk factors have been the cornerstone of risk assessment and intervention 
processes that have shaped YJS policy and practice since 1998.  
 
The replicability of this risk factor evidence-base across the Cambridge Study, and the wealth 
of research studies that it has influenced, has been a key rationale for embedding its findings 
within youth justice processes. However, replicability, possibly suffering from confirmation 
bias, has been privileged to the neglect of the clear weaknesses and limitations in the study. 
The Cambridge Study has produced findings that when applied to contemporary youth justice 
can be considered to be: androcentric (focused only on young males), class-centric (focused 
only on the working class) and urban-centric (generated without accessing rural samples); not 
to mention out-dated (generated in the 1960s and applied uncritically over 50 years later) and 
demonstrating psychosocial bias (e.g. not considering socio-structural or situational 
influences) - thus rendering these findings of limited ecological validity, generalisability and 
transferability/applicability. Dogged and uncritical governmental adherence to the RFPP 
justified by the Cambridge Study is indicative of an entrenched bias-driving policy agenda 
fuelled by policy-based evidence-approaches promoting inertia. 
 
 
Notwithstanding the dominance of the RFPP-led thinking and practice in youth justice, 
however, academia could offer a different pathway to change. Contemporary criminological 
research has prioritised eliciting the voices of children who offend to investigate how they 
experience, construct and negotiate ‘risk’ in qualitative, personally-meaningful ways (cf. the 
Edinburgh Study - McAra and McVie 2015, 2007; the Teesside Studies - MacDonald 2007; 
the ESRC Pathways projects - France and Homel 2007). Evidence-based constructivist 
11 
 
understandings of how children negotiate and resist ‘pathways” into and out of offending 
have subsequently influenced children first policy formations in Wales (e.g. the ‘Children and 
Young People First’ youth justice strategy - Welsh Government and YJB 2014) and the 
nascent ‘Participation Strategy’ of the YJB for England and Wales (YJB 2016). 
  
Associated research has begun to incorporate desistance thinking into youth justice work, 
shifting the focus from factors allegedly leading to offending (risk factors), onto reasons for 
its cessation. A major current desistance focus is on pathways to changing personal 
narratives, away from self-identifying as an offender, and towards identifying as a non-
offender. There is an inherent difficulty in applying extant desistance research, which is 
largely adult-centric, directly to youth justice, since children are not considered to have a 
hardened criminal identity, seeming to ‘drift’ in and out of crime, without commitment to it 
(Matza, 1964). However, there is now an emerging literature-base of complementary research 
looking at applications for children (see for example Barry 2006; Johns et al., 2016). 
Therefore, a slightly different understanding has been adopted; one focused on maturity as 
facilitating desistance (Rocque 2015). For years, children who commit crime infrequently, or 
seriously, have been treated as criminals within a criminal system. However, the pathway to 
change is an academically-driven, conceptual/paradigmatic shift from the deficit-focused risk 
agenda towards more promotional, strengths-based approaches, so the time is ripe for a 
different approach.   
 
The incremental development of youth justice-based research brings with it opportunities to 
address the challenges to progression and evolution should the political will emerge. A lack 
of evidence-based, research-informed consensus around new concepts and approaches in 
youth justice (e.g. the participation and desistance agendas) is a key issue for academia and 
for policy and practice development. It can result in confused and contradictory messages to 
practitioners, children and the general public. Additionally, the power of academia to 
promote reform and change in youth justice through evidence generation can be mitigated by 
political expediency and professional experience (see Smith 2014), which may explain the 
somewhat piecemeal way in which strategic concepts such as ‘desistance’ are integrated into 
the existent YJS through practice and process. There are tentative signs of an emerging focus 
on bridging the academic-professional and integrating academic research understandings into 
the development of youth justice. Notably, the ‘Academic/YOT Partnership Working Guide’ 
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(YJB 2017) encourages collaboration between the youth justice sector (n.b. YOTs, not the 
YJB itself) and the academic/research community. The guide asserts that such partnerships 
will enable youth justice workers to access expert advice and training (from 
academics/researchers) and will provide academics with valuable access to youth justice data 
and staff – with the objective of developing effective practice. Two notable examples of these 
symbiotic partnerships are Greater Manchester Youth Justice University Partnership and Hwb 
Doeth in Wales. Greater Manchester Youth Justice University Partnership was established in 
2014 and has set up a Knowledge Transfer Partnership between Manchester Metropolitan 
University and the Greater Manchester youth justice services. Hwb Doeth is somewhat 
newer, having begun in 2017, and was a development of the already existent Practice 
Development Panel of YJB Cymru. It now encompasses all universities and YOTs within 
Wales, so that mutually beneficial research can be facilitated, and practice developed as a 
result.  
 
These developments demonstrate that while historically there has been something of a gulf 
between those at the coal-face of youth justice practice and those seeking to research 
effectiveness in the field, resulting in delays in communication or even politically-expedient 
side-lining of new knowledge, the future seems able to promise more cross-pollination 
between research and practice, which could be a driver for policy and legislative change.   
 
4. Cognisant pathways  
A perennial, yet often unrecognised issue (a potential enabler and obstacle) to affecting 
change in youth justice is that of cognisance - knowledge, awareness and understanding of 
the paradigms/models, concepts, theories and tenets that drive the field. Cognisance is not 
necessarily consensual or equitable between key stakeholders in youth justice. Levels of 
cognisance can vary between and within the stakeholder organisations and local areas, 
influencing the validity (accuracy, comprehensiveness and appropriateness) of 
understandings of youth offending and youth justice and the transfer of policy into practice in 
linear and consistent ways. One obstacle to consistent and effective policy generation and 
implementation in practice is the unacknowledged and somewhat inevitable partiality (bias 
and incompleteness) in the cognisance of key stakeholders. Partiality influences and shapes 
everyday youth justice practice, manifested in organisational agendas and priorities. A key 
exemplar is the YJB itself, the strategic lead for youth justice work in England and Wales, 
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and so the central hub for effective practice for YOTs. Arguably, the YJB retains a somewhat 
problematic and confused understanding of key youth justice concepts such as desistance, 
prevention, and diversion – all still indelibly tainted by the risk agenda. This deficit-led, risk 
focus, which consolidates constructions of dangerous, troublesome children, has been used to 
justify continued support for punishment in sentencing guidelines, despite it original rationale 
being to inform preventative practice. The result has been mixed messages communicated to 
practitioners, exemplified by a disconnect between the rationale for youth justice approaches, 
hegemonic sentencing strategies and recommendations for working practices.  
 
At the paradigmatic/conceptual level, for example, there is deep-rooted confusion and 
misunderstanding regarding prevention, the central plank of youth justice policy and practice, 
and the primary aim of the YJS. Prevention is regularly conflated with related, yet distinct 
principles such as early intervention and diversion in youth justice policy and practice 
guidance. The prevention of offending is not synonymous with early intervention (typically 
operationalised as identifying and targeting measurable risks for offending); nor is it 
synonymous with diversion (redirecting children away from the formal YJS and into other 
services). Neither is the prevention of offending (for the first time) synonymous with the 
prevention of reoffending; nor does it necessarily share the same risk factors if this is to be 
the evidence-base relied upon. Furthermore, prevention (similarly early intervention and 
diversion) need not be risk-focused and/or targeted/individualised, but the YJB and 
government appear insistent that it should be. Even when targeted and individualised, 
prevention practice can focus on addressing children’s needs, wishes, rights, strengths and 
opportunities, rather than emphasising risk factors (Haines and Case 2015). Partiality towards 
risk-focused prevention artificially restricts the scope and ambition of pathways to change - 
wedding it to neo-correctionalist, retrospective and deficit-focused perspectives. Partiality 
towards the continued conflation of prevention, early intervention and diversion along 
pathways to change is indicative of both misunderstandings and neglect of their fundamental 
differences in philosophy and approach, which itself can artificially restrict practice when 
(mis)translated by youth justice staff.  
 
At the practice level, the YJB has sought to develop newer academic thinking in criminology 
around desistance within youth justice and to implement this within the AssetPlus 
assessment-intervention process. However, they have not acknowledged the potentially poor 
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fit for ‘desistance’ with children, discussed earlier. Desistance work in youth justice might be 
better considered as promoting pro-social development, rather than facilitating children to 
completely change direction (more associated with adult desistance). This means that the 
YJB has embedded ‘desistance’ within its parameters, rather than pro-social development, 
possibly indicating a lack of understanding both of desistance as a concept or process, and of 
adult-centric research into this area. An attitude which considers children to be ‘mini-adults’ 
should have long been consigned to history, but appears to have been resurrected here, 
constituting an obstacle to the adoption of more relevant aspects.  
 
Another, possibly more devastating, issue is that although much of the desistance literature 
concentrates on the importance of working with strengths and facilitating personal identity 
shift towards the non-criminal, necessarily meaning a move away from risk-centric thinking 
(which results in negative offence-focused working), this appears to have been ignored in 
documents from both the YJB and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation (hereafter ‘the 
Inspectorate’). Indeed, the Inspectorate’s thematic inspection report formulated ‘desistance’ 
quite differently from the YJB, surely creating systemic confusion for practitioners in both 
cognisance and outworking of this into practice (Hampson 2018). Both institutions have 
made significant alterations to their expectations, as evidenced by the current assessment tool 
of AssetPlus for the YJB (2014), and the new inspection framework for the Inspectorate 
(2017), to incorporate desistance, but to which model should YOTs align themselves? 
Additionally, this has resulted in an uncomfortable mixture of model-base, since the RFPP 
still underpins YOT working (and Inspectorate inspections), but now with something of an 
additional desistance ‘bolt-on’. AssetPlus, in still being a risk assessment tool (risk of 
reoffending, risk of serious harm to others and risk of vulnerability) seems to ask 
practitioners to combine opposing models, resulting in an unhappy emulsion, potentially 
compromising the effectiveness of positive, strengths-based interventions. Any pathway to 
change in paradigmatic model-base towards a more positive strengths-based approach needs 
sound understanding of the research by those propounding the changes, and a purer 
application without the pollution of the previous risk approach.  
 
Desistance-focused assessment  
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There is some evidence through examinations of AssetPlus that positive work with children is 
now understood, welcomed and justified in intervention plans (cf. Hampson 2018). However 
there is a lack of emphasis on positive working which could facilitate pro-social development 
incidentally, for example taking quality time to build relationship between worker and 
child/young person. Although most workers acknowledge the importance of this, it is seen as 
a pre-cursor to the ‘more important work’ of reducing risk; evidenced by two of the five ‘key 
areas of intervention’ being negatively phrased; ‘not offending’ and ‘not hurting others’, 
invites specific interventions, rather than seeing pro-social development as addressing them 
more naturally. Consequently, managers still look for risk-reducing work (as defined by the 
RFPP) to be undertaken, dragging children back to offence-focused work, which does not 
allow them to see themselves differently. Practitioners have expressed this concern, that it has 
held them back from fully embracing positive-focused interventions. They have also voiced 
that courts expect such documents as Pre-Sentence Reports to address risk as a priority, 
which requires identifying offence-focused work as a major goal of any intervention. Until 
magistrates and judges understand such approaches, practitioners feel they will be hampered 
in their efforts to employ them (Hampson 2018). This demonstrates a much wider issue with 
cognisance than just the YJB and YOTs. 
 
 
Notwithstanding tinkering at the edges and stochastic statecraft as examples of change within 
youth justice, YOTs have had to make sense of much tangible change over the years since 
their inception, from varying YJB ‘Key Performance Indicators’, the introduction and 
subsequent changes to National Standards, the strictures of actuarial risk assessments and the 
move to a less risk-obsessed assessment framework. The earlier changes driven by the Crime 
and Disorder Act 1998 placed more structure around YOTs, progressively eroding 
practitioners’ skills and decision-making, whilst ‘prescribing’ cognisance to an extent - 
privileging partial governmental/YJB understandings of the central drivers of effective youth 
justice. Since the Scaled Approach (the peak of external interference), requirements have 
progressively reduced, leaving more responsibility for decision-making and the development 
of expert, nuanced understandings with practitioners themselves. This transition to more 
autonomy has been difficult, requiring practitioners to have more individual understanding, 
leaving many lacking confidence in their skills and ability to complete a somewhat less 
structured assessment (AssetPlus) (Hampson 2018). This offers great potential for 
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practitioners to embed change into their practice, but without adequate training, is a difficult 
path to tread and threatens a disconnect between policy and practice. Compounding this 
issue, YJB and the Inspectorate cognisance of desistance approaches appears variable and at 
odds, leading to confused messages being filtered down to managers and individual YOT 
workers. For example, the Inspectorate’s thematic inspection on desistance (2016) identified 
the building of positive empathic relationships as key, whereas this aspect of working was not 
even mentioned within the AssetPlus rationale document, or given house-room within the 
structure of that assessment (YJB 2014). This, when coupled with insufficient training (or 
ineffective training methodology), potentially turns an opportunity into an obstacle.  
 
Finally, the facility for practitioners to develop constructive relationships with children along 
pathways to practice change is also dependent on relationships further up the ladder. YOT 
workers are answerable to managers, who supervise their work and offer guidance for future 
development. If YOT managers are not fully cognisant of changes in policy, and the 
underlying models, then their expectations of workers could tend towards being risk-focused, 
as this is the only way prevention is perceived to be operational. In part this is fuelled by 
(confused and confusing) communications from the YJB, but also from the inspectorate, both 
agencies, having conflated desistance and risk into the same arena (mainly regarding 
AssetPlus). However, the ladder continues upwards, with both the YJB and inspectorate 
being answerable to government, and therefore aiming to service the priorities of whoever is 
in power (with all the resultant emphasis on vote-winning policies to reassure the public that 
the ‘problem’ of youth is being addressed). The filter which this gives governments in the 
interpretation of research provides for an uneasy relationship with academia, resulting in 
policies which only reflect findings sympathetic to their political cause.  
 
There appears to be little agreement or understanding within and between key structures and 
organisations of the YJS at all levels regarding how to understand and implement central 
concepts of youth justice such as prevention, diversion and desistance, which can translate 
into difficulties for practice. This lack of cognisance in key areas, including youth justice 
model-base, has resulted in new developments, promising for future development, being 
promoted and rolled-out in inconsistent, partial and confused ways. Any disconnect in 
cognisance between key stakeholders could be addressed by developing closer working 
relationships to critically reflect upon the central tenets and driving concepts of youth justice. 
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Although there is a tentative focus on this situation through the academic/partnership agenda 
(YJB 2017, there appears little appetite from the YJB for England and Wales (as opposed to 
YJB Cymru) to work more closely with YOTs (beyond tokenistic and post-hoc ‘consultation’ 
exercises) or academics/researchers to critically interrogate and develop shared 
understandings of the essential premises of youth justice nationally. The future progression of 
youth justice policy understandings and their implementation in meaningful practice would 
seem to largely rely on the YJB modelling the work of YJB Cymru and key youth justice 
services in England (e.g. Surrey’s Youth Support Service – see Byrne and Case 2016, the 
Greater Manchester Youth Justice University Partnership – see Axon and Jones, in Case 
2018) in terms of engagement with academic research/critical friends and engagement with 
its own mantra of effective practice development through evidence-based policy and critical 
reflection. 
 
Discussion: Pathways to change in youth justice 
It is apparent that the pathways to change in the systems, structures, strategies, policies, 
philosophies and practices of youth justice in England and Wales have been and remain non-
linear (even arbitrary), multiple, contested and multi-faceted. Pathways to change are 
constituted by a series of inter-related and dynamic influences that can be categorised as 
paradigmatic, political, research-led and cognisant. However, despite the ostensible 
dynamism of the youth justice policy field, related changes are not always real or substantial 
and can be stochastic and rhetorical - anchored to stability and manifested through tinkering 
and bolt-ons, themselves often the product of socio-political economic anxieties, investment, 
entrenchment and austerity. We assert that the pathways to real change in youth justice policy 
are fraught with difficulty, with many voices seeking to be heard in its current and future 
development. The Government (operating along political pathways) is ultimately the key 
driver for change, experienced through the centuries as an increasing need for children to be 
treated differently to adults, yet with disagreement on how that should look. We are inclined, 
therefore, to support Phoenix’s (2016: 124) observation of a fundamental rupture in the 
relationship ‘between how we deal with youth crime (i.e. the processes, procedures and 
provisions) and why we do it (i.e. any higher philosophical or ethical goals)’. Consequently, 
more attention should be paid to the paradigmatic and research-led pathways to change that 
inter-relate with and impact upon cognisant pathways to change, with a view to encouraging 
more reflectiveness and reflexivity in political pathways and the relationships between key 
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stakeholders who interact across youth justice processes. Despite a necessary focus on the 
England and Wales context, adopting the pathways lens identifies lessons that are clearly 
transferable to other jurisdictions in terms of how to examine the development of youth 
justice and how to understand the operation and complexities of the influences upon this 
development.    
 
Influencing government is always the pervasive, populist and punitive voice of the media, 
purporting to be the voice of the ordinary person in the street, which politicians ignore at their 
peril. Less influential, yet typically more balanced and better informed, has been the voice of 
the critical academic and empirical researcher operating along research-led pathways, 
particularly those outwith the developmentalist RFPP movement (functioning within 
paradigmatic pathways). Seemingly marginal to all of these influencers have been youth 
justice practitioners working at the coal face with children - who have been even less 
influential and often entirely unheard. Returning to our title, it could be argued that the 
drivers (including their related obstacles), challenges and opportunities operating along 
identified pathways to change in youth justice are essentially different sides of the same coin. 
The paradigmatic, political, research-led and cognisant drivers of change need to be 
mobilised in order to overcome obstacles to change (e.g. inertia, austerity, 
misunderstandings), to address the challenges of contemporary youth justice (e.g. doing the 
same or more with less) and to maximise opportunities for growth and progress (e.g. towards 
a children first system). 
 
It must be acknowledged that there are some promising green shoots of opportunity emerging 
within youth justice policy and practice development, assisted by research indicating the 
utility of diversion, minimal intervention and strengths-based, pro-social and positive 
practice. The incorporation of desistance approaches into YJB guidance and the AssetPlus 
framework, for example, coupled with a new, more positive, the Inspectorate’s inspection 
framework and emerging academic/YOT partnerships, shows a promising direction of travel. 
Some individual localities are evidently developing good practice in this area, which is to be 
commended and provides direction elsewhere, where progress has perhaps been slower. 
There appears to be an appetite for change amongst practitioners, who recognise the benefits 
of working positively with children (especially those who have been in the system long 
enough to remember pre- Crime and Disorder Act working), but who are not sufficiently 
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confident to entirely cut the apron strings of the RFPP. Consequently, this is a potential driver 
for change, but wrapped up within an obstacle.  
 
Turning challenges into opportunities and recommendations 
There are, therefore, significant challenges facing the sector if change is to be holistic, 
effective and permanent, rather than regressive or stochastic. Opportunity lies in identifying 
and clarifying the most appropriate model-base for youth justice without relying on research 
with adults or conflating models of risk and desistance. This then needs to be communicated 
effectively with youth justice practitioners and their managers, to provide sound 
understanding upon which to base their work and defend decisions. Such communication 
needs to go much further than the YOTs, so that the judiciary are also able to understand the 
model-base of reports. Another challenge is to encourage stakeholders across the system to 
appreciate the value of allowing children to participate in intervention decision-making. The 
role of the YJB seems pivotal in addressing the contemporary challenges faced by youth 
justice and embedding change within practice. More generally, policy and practice appear to 
be evolving towards the increasing integration of the youth justice agenda and its animating 
structures (e.g. YOTs) within wider children’s systems and services (see Taylor 2016). 
Therefore, a comprehensive and valid examination of change in youth justice should adopt a 
broader purview - analysing the multiple different institutions, organisations, practices, 
relationships and discourses involved in responding to children in trouble/need and the buried 
socio-political, economic, legal and evidential influences on their respective and combined 
abilities to affect change. 
 
Considered in the round, the contemporary youth justice context offers an open playing field 
for those seeking meaningful change. Socio-political economic uncertainties and anxieties 
conspire to produce and ‘ironic storm’, wherein ostensibly poor conditions for change 
actually present opportunities for significant change. This change can be driven by local 
innovation, organisational/practitioner discretion and closer working relationships between 
stakeholders (including children), rather than shaped by excessive managerialism, 
governance and prescriptions. Whether this change is necessarily centralised, formalised or 
supported financially is another question! There is an opportunity to really change policy 
focus away from a negative risk-led model, turning instead towards a strengths-based positive 
model that facilitates pro-social development and positive outcomes for children - thus 
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attempting to heal the rupture between the how and the why of youth justice. This 
necessitates, however, viewing children who offend as children first, rather than focusing on 
their offending behaviour. Desistance literature indicates that concentrating on the positive is 
effective in reducing offending (at least for adults), so applying a ‘Children First, Offender 
Second’ (CFOS – Haines and Case 2015) model appeals. Currently, the potential for such 
change is seriously compromised by clinging to facets of risk-thinking as the only way of 
reducing re/offending behaviour. This negative, retrospective, risk perspective is anathema to 
change and progress, but is also beginning to be rebuffed by growing research looking at 
children’s pro-social development, rather than thinking in terms of desisting from having a 
criminal identity (which does not typify children’s offending). Concurrently, the CFOS 
paradigm is beginning to pervade policy change, or at least, recommendations for policy 
change in England and Wales. The new Inspectorate inspection framework for YOTs (HMIP 
2017) specifically assesses children’s participation in the whole youth justice process, 
including co-production of intervention plans. This ethos is starting to characterise strategic 
and policy responses in England and Wales, with direct reference to ‘children first’ principles 
in the national policing strategy for children (‘Child Centred Policing’ – NPCC 2015), 
sentencing guidelines for violent and sexual offenders (Sentencing Council 2015), national 
youth justice for Wales (‘Children and Young People First’ – YJB and Welsh Government 
2014), recommendations for reorientation of the entire YJS (Taylor 2016) and proclamations 
from the YJB signifying wholesale strategic changes towards a ‘children first’ approach 
prioritising rights, strengths, engagement and diversion (YJB 2018: 7). 
 
What has become ‘clear’ across the piece is the lack of clarity regarding how change occurs 
in youth justice and the nature of this change. The mooted pathways to change are very 
probably inter-related and most definitely complex, nuanced, non-linear and subjective in 
nature. Notwithstanding this complexity, the multiple, inter-related and dynamic nature of 
these influences also presents an opportunity for key stakeholders working between and 
within different youth justice contexts and organisations; an opportunity to collaborate on an 
holistic and consensual agenda for change. We assert the need for policy, practice and 
perspective change in youth justice - a progressive and positive change (e.g. extending the 
‘children first’ trajectory of change) in paradigmatic and political terms, a change that is 
simultaneously research-led, easier to communicate and understand (facilitating cognisance) 
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and is foundational for robust relationships - all of which are significant influences along the 
pathways to change in youth justice. 
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